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AN ACCOUNT OF THE LEGAL STRATEGIES THAT
ENDED AN ERA OF TOBACCO INDUSTRY IMMUNITYt
Michael V. Ciresitt
Let me also express my appreciation for being here today with
this group of people dedicated to the eradication of the number-
one killer of Minnesotans, and indeed of people across the country.
I am disappointed that members of the industry, other than Lig-
gett,1 are not here because I think that they can help enlighten and
inform the public debate.
I want to start out by distinguishing Minnesota from the color-
ful figures that Peter Pringle mentioned during his remarks.2 I do
that for a very specific reason. We are different, tremendously dif-
ferent, from those other lawyers who sued the industry-and I do
not criticize their motives-but they had an approach of "let's go
out and get all the people we can, sue these folks, and see if we
can't get it settled." They lost sight of what I call the marriage be-
tween law and public policy. We hear much criticism of lawyers; it
goes with the profession. I have always believed, and our cases at
Robins, Kaplan have always shown, that lawyers have an overarch-
ing duty to the rule of law, a duty to society, over and above a duty
t This essay is based on a speech Michael V. Ciresi gave at William Mitchell
College of Law's Center for Health Law & Policy symposium tided, "Tobacco
Regulation: The Convergence of Law, Medicine & Public Health."
tt Name Partner and Chairman of the Executive Board of Robins, Kaplan,
Miller & Ciresi, L.L.P. His trial practice and consulting are focused in the areas of
product liability, intellectual property, and business and commercial litigation.
Mr. Ciresi's cases include State of Minnesota & Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota
v. Philip Morris Inc., et al.; Honeywell v. Minolta; Unocal Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.;
Pitney Bowes v. Hewlett Packard Ecolab v. Ford; the Dalkon Shield litigation; Copper-7
litigation; and Government of India v. Union Carbide, in which he was chief counsel
for the Government of India. He has been listed in The Best Lawyers in America
since 1989 and has been named twice in the National Law Journal's annual list of
"Ten of the Nation's Top Trial Lawyers."
1. See Paul Caminiti, An Industry Perspective and the Unique Role of the Liggett
Group, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. Rzv. 447 (1999).
2. See Peter Pringle, The Chronicles of Tobacco: An Account of the Forces that
Brought the Tobacco Industry to the Negotiating Table, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 387
(1999).
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to their individual clients. Most lawyers forget this, and so we see
some of the things that we have witnessed in litigation in this coun-
try.
In our suit against the tobacco industry, we did not have sixty
law firms contributing a hundred thousand dollars a year, which
comes to six million dollars a year, or twenty-four million dollars
over four years. We had one law firm. The industry had sixty law
firms, six hundred lawyers, all against our one law firm. We were
the only state in the Union that was represented by one law firm,
whose allegiance was to one state, and not to a number of states
that may have had different motives and objectives in the litigation.
And the truth, and I think the merit of our position, is best de-
scribed by the settlement.3
When we started this case I said to Attorney General Hum-
phrey, "the only thing I ask, besides your support, is that in this
case our objectives will be dictated by, and our actions will be taken
on, their legal merits, and not on political considerations." The at-
torney general replied, "you have my word on that." His word is as
good as gold, and that approach set us apart from the rest of the
states. It was exceedingly difficult for the attorney general, in April
1997, when the national settlement was proposed, to tell people
that he had worked with for over sixteen years, "you're wrong and
we're taking a different course."4 For three-and-a-half years I could
stand up across the country in any forum and say, "we are going to
hold the industry accountable. We in Minnesota don't fight; you
don't hear the governor saying one thing and the attorney general
saying another."
For three-and-a-half years that was true. It changed all of a
sudden, however, when we got close to trial, when we had people
saying, "Take the national settlement. Take the $4.1 billion. For-
get about all the other reasons for which you started this suit. For-
get about the fact that we wanted to expose the industry's internal
documents. Forget about the fact that we wanted the non-
monetary relief. Forget about the fact that we did not want to
emasculate the FDA. Forget about the fact that we did not want to
3. See Settlement Agreement and Stipulation for Entry of'Judgment, State ex
rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 394331 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. May 8, 1998) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement].
4. See Hubert H. "Skip" Humphrey, III, The Decision to Reject the June, 1997




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss2/5
1999] LEGAL STRATEGIES THAT ENDED INDUSTRY IMMUNITY 441
create special privileges by immunizing an industry that kills over
four hundred thousand Americans a year.6 Forget all of that and
join us, and let's just get a settlement."
We took a different course, and instead of $4.1 billion, the
6state of Minnesota got $6.1 billion. More importantly, it got all of
the non-monetary relief that you see in that consent judgement.7
All the other lawyers suing the industry were smart in one thing:
they got a "most favored nation" clause" in their settlements be-
cause they knew Minnesota-led by Skip Humphrey,9 Andy Cza-
jkowski, 0 and our law firm-would not fold. They knew we would
try the case and hold the industry accountable. So they wanted a
"most favored nation" clause because if Minnesota got something
more favorable, they wanted to benefit, and indeed they did."
5. See Sabin Russell, Tobacco Deal's Youth Campaign: Just Say Scam, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 7, 1998, at A8 (asserting that cigarettes kill 400,000 Americans each
year; see also Sen. BillyJ. Mckibben Hobbs, Put People's Health Before Johnson's Politi-
cal Health, ALBUQUERQUEJ., Apr. 16, 1998, at A15 (citing the American Cancer So-
ciety for the proposition that "smoking related diseases kill more than 400,000
Americans each year").
6. See Settlement Agreement, Philip Morris, 1998 WL 394331, at *6.
7. See Consent Judgment, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No.
C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 394336, at *2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 8, 1998). For example,
the tobacco companies are permanently enjoined from marketing cigarettes to
children in Minnesota and from advertising on billboards, buses or transit areas.
See id.
8. A "most favored nation" clause provided that a state could upgrade its set-
tlement with the tobacco companies to take advantage of "any additional benefits
negotiated by later-settling states." Bill Van Voris, Minn. Smoke Trial Starts: Big To-
bacco Faces AG Hubert Humphrey III and Perhaps Its Toughest Fight, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 12,
1998, at A6. The Mississippi, Florida and Texas tobacco settlements contained
such a clause. See id. See also Mark Curriden & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Tobacco Deal
Could Hit $20 Billion: Minnesota Case May Allow Texas to Get Extra Money, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, May 15, 1998, at IA ("'The "most favored nation" clause is truly
one of the ingenious provisions ever dreamed up by trial lawyers,' said Martin
Feldman, a Wall Street analyst with the investment firm Salomon Smith Barney.").
9. Hubert "Skip" Humphrey, III, was Minnesota's attorney general during
the tobacco litigation. See generally Humphrey, supra note 4.
10. Andrew Czajkowski is chief executive officer of Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Minnesota, which was co-plaintiff with the State of Minnesota in the to-
bacco litigation. See Andrew P. Czajkowski, The Making of a Lawsuit: A Health Plan
Perspective, 25 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 379 (1999).
11. See Bruce Hight, Tobacco Victoy Declared; Cash to Start Flowing: All Sides Agree
to a Settlement, But Attorney's Fees are Still in Doubt, AUSTIN AM.-STATEsMAN, July 25,
1998, at B1. Hight noted:
After Texas reached agreement with the tobacco industry, Minnesota set-
tled its lawsuit on even more favorable terms, triggering the "most fa-
vored nation" clause in the Texas settlement. That clause said that the
3
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Mississippi, led by Michael Moore, who I have called a carnival
barker, although I don't mean that in a bad sense, got a lot of states
to get involved. That played a factor in moving the national legisla-
tion. Of course it failed, ' but they played a factor in that. Michael
Moore's state got an additional five hundred and fifty million dol-
lars because of our settlement. 13 Texas fot $2.3 billion because of
our settlement. 14 Florida got $1.7 billion, and they all got the non-
monetary relief. 16
Who carried the burden? We did.
Of course no good deed goes unpunished, and now we hear
some criticisms, and I will accept those criticisms. We were in the
public eye and I understand that, and we have forthrightly said
from 1994 what we were doing. Our retainer agreement was filed.
Nobody said, "Hey Mike, let me contribute, this is a hell of an
idea." Indeed, I saw former Minnesota Governor Wendell Ander-
son yesterday, and he reminded me that in October of 1997 I was
giving a speech with the attorney general out at the airport. At that
meeting were attorneys from across the world. We debated the na-
tional settlement. We, of course, stated our position and during
the course of that I said, "alright, now you've heard it all." Now this
is October or November of 1997, and I said, "how many of you
industry would pay Texas more if other states later got better terms. The
Minnesota settlement generated an additional $2.3 billion for Texas.
Id.; see also Judge OKs Tobacco Settlement Bonus for State, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 10,
1998, at D12. ("Florida will receive a bonus of $1.7 billion over the next five years
from its agreement with the tobacco industry to boost the overall settlement to
$12.7 billion .... Florida obtained the extra $1.7 billion under a 'most favored
nation' clause in its 1997 settlement.").
12. See Anthony Flint, Tobacco Agreement Gives States a Tool to Push Enforcement,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 23, 1997, at Al. The original proposal was the result of nego-
tiations between the states' attorneys general and tobacco companies, and it re-
quired congressional approval to take effect. See id. It called for cigarette manu-
facturers to pay $368 billion to the states and the federal government over a
fifteen-year period in return for immunity from lawsuits by state or local govern-
ments. See id. After undergoing considerable alterations and additions, the pro-
posed settlement finally died in June 1998 after reaching $516 billion. SeeJames
Rosen, Tobacco Bill Dies. The Senate Voted to Send Its Bill Back to Committee, Effectively
Killing it and Triggering an Election-Year Battle Over the Issue of Youth Smoking, STAR
TRIM. (Minneapolis-St. Paul),June 18, 1998, at 1A.
13. See Across the USA: News from Every State, USA ToDAY, July 8, 1998, at 13A.
14. See Hight, supra note 11, at B1.
15. See Judge OKs Tobacco Settlement Bonus, supra note 11, at D12.
16. See Curriden & Oppel, supra note 11, at Al; Judge OKs Tobacco Settlement
Bonus, supra note 11, at D12.
[Vol. 25
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managing partners or substantial partners in all these law firms...
how many of you want to contribute to our case, which we are go-
ing to start in January, and we are standing alone, and we are look-
ing at federal legislation that is going to emasculate our lawsuit-
how many of you would like to join in? Raise your hand." Not one
did. Not one.
So when I hear the criticism I will accept it, but Minnesotans
used to have a tradition that I treasured. Maybe it's because I was
born, bred and raised here. That tradition was: we used to talk
about the facts. We debated the facts. We would enlighten the
public. We would not deal in lies and distortions. So I will debate
the facts with anyone, and I will point out the distortions when I see
them.
The themes of our case were simple and led to the documents
that Roberta Walburn has spoken about. 7 Our themes were: the
defendants had a duty to know, discover and disclose the hazards of
their product; they could not sell a legal product illegally; and
there are no special privileges or exemptions for the cigarette in-
dustry. Why should they be treated differently than 3M or Med-
tronic or Honeywell or any other great company in this country?
They should be held accountable the same way everyone else is.
We were never prohibitionists, and the case was never about prohi-
bition.
The case was about corporate responsibility and accountability.
The taxpayers-the citizens-should not pay. The shareholders
should pay if these companies violated state laws. The industry had
intentionally concealed facts, contrary to their voluntary promise
and undertaking that they made in 1954, when they said the pro-
tectioi of the public health was their paramount responsibility.18
They could not mislead by their intentional and misleading public
pronouncements. They could not intentionally exploit the youth
market; over eighty-two percent of people who start smoking start
17. See Roberta B. Walburn, The Role of the Once-Confidential Industry Documents,
25 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 431 (1999); see also Michael V. Ciresi et al., Decades of De-
ceit: Document Discovery in the Minnesota Tobacco Litigation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REv.
477 (1999).
18. See Ciresi et al., supra note 17, 520 nn.196-97 and accompanying text. The
tobacco industry's "Frank Statement," a 1954 advertisement that appeared in
newspapers across the United States in which the tobacco industry "accept[ed] an
interest in the people's health as a basic responsibility. . ." and asserted that it "al-
ways ha[s] and always will cooperate closely with those whose task it is to safeguard
the public health." See id.
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before age seventeen;'9 if you eliminate or dramatically reduce that
eighty-two percent, this industry will not be as wealthy and powerful
as it is today. Next, they intentionally exploited nicotine to create
habituation, addiction and dependence. Because of these actions
there was unprecedented carnage caused in this state and in this
country.
Our trial approach was pretty simple. We led off with our own
witnesses to establish our case. We had a choice between Dr. Rich-
ard Hurt ° and Channing Robertson. Dr. Hurt runs the Mayo
Clinic's Nicotine Dependence Clinic and is world renowned. He
was a unique witness because he was born in Kentucky. He was
formerly a smoker-in fact, a heavy smoker. He was passionate in
his belief about what this industry was doing to people in this coun-
try and across the world. Between him and Channing Robertson,
who is a great chemist from Stanford University, we chose Dr. Hurt
to testify first because he could tell the complete story. Hurt had
studied the industry extensively over a long period of time, and he
was a remarkable witness, as was Channing.
Hurt and Robertson were our first two witnesses. Then we
switched and went after their people because we wanted the jury to
hear this case through the industry's words and documents. I al-
ways prefer to have people from the other side in a case because I
want someone live there, someone who the jury can look in the eye
and judge their credibility: is what they are saying plausible and
reasonable in light of these documents that you see? So that is
what we did. We called Mr. Walker Merryman, the head of the To-
bacco Institute; Dr. James Glenn, head of the Council for Tobacco
Research; Mr. Geoffrey Bible, chief executive officer of Philip Mor-
ris; and Mr. James Schindler, the president of RJR Tobacco to tes-
tify. Through those witnesses, I believe the jury saw and witnessed
this industry's deceptiveness.
Bible was going to be the smooth, Australian chief executive
officer of this Fortune 50 company. A remarkable witness in the
sense that they sent him to charm school because they thought that
they could get him to a point were he was going to just "wow" the
jury. He's a pleasant guy. You would look at him and think, yeah,
19. SeeJohn G. Carlton, Health Officials Help Teach Teens to Quit Smoking, ST.
Louis POST-DIsPATcH, Feb. 8, 1998, at Cl (asserting that 82% of lifelong smokers
begin by age 17).
20. See Richard D. Hurt, M.D., The Influence of the Minnesota Tobacco Trial on the
Healthcare Community and Tobacco Regulation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 455 (1999).
[Vol. 25
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I'd like to have a beer with him sometime. That's if you put aside
the fact that he's the head of the largest cigarette manufacturer-
they are killing thousands of people a year, he knows it, they are
doing it willfully and intentionally, and they are exploiting our
youth. Put that aside, and he's a hell of a guy.
They put Bible on the witness stand and we cross-examined
him and a funny thing started happening to him over a period of
time. It was a three-day cross-examination, and as he started seeing
these documents, we could see his tenor change. At one point, Bi-
ble tried to project the image that he was only looking forward.
Keep in mind, now, that during this time the national settlement
21was going on, and they were going to wipe out the lawsuits. When
Bible took over in 1994, in Philip Morris' annual report, 2 he said,
21. During the yearlong period during which Congress considered and modi-
fied the national tobacco settlement, the tobacco companies insisted that the legis-
lation must grant them immunity from future lawsuits. See Peter Grier & James N.
Thurman, Back to Court Cases on Tobacco. Congress Balked at a Deal. Now Tobacco Firms
Face Suits by States and Individuals Armed with Strong New Evidence, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR,June 19, 1998, at 1.
22. See PM 2047120454-55. In the annual report, under a subheading labeled
"Defending Our Company," Bible assured Philip Morris shareholders:
" No doubt you're aware of the many pressures facing the U.S. tobacco industry;
public smoking restrictions, possible excise tax hikes, the threat of FDA regula-
tion, congressional hearings, negative media coverage, litigation.
" Still, you should remember that our U.S. tobacco company has faced similar
threats before and has overcome them. I want to make this crystal clear: We be-
lieve these issues remain manageable.
" On the legislative and regulatory fronts, we have already weathered several
storms, as the dark clouds of massive federal excise tax hikes and more federal
regulation of cigarettes appear to have passed for now.
" In the legal arena, we are committing all the resources necessary to de-
fend the company from new forms of litigation, making sure we have
better firepower than our foes, no matter how formidable.
" In the new class-action suits and state Medicaid cases, we believe the law con-
tinues to be on our side. Although these new cases pose difficult challenges, we
should ultimately prevail in them, just as we have been successful in other types
of cases over the past 40 years. It is important to note here that the tobacco in-
dustry has never lost or paid to settle a case.
" Beyond defending ourselves, we are turning the legal tables on some of
those who attack us. We are going on the offensive to vindicate our
rights and to make it clear that current notions of "political correct-
ness" cannot be used to justify unlawful conduct that abridges those
rights.
" We're suing the EPA over its misleading report on secondhand smoke,
suing state and local governments that have unlawfully restricted pub-
lic smoking, and suing ABC for falsely accusing us of "spiking" our
cigarettes with extra nicotine.
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about people who might sue them, to paraphrase Winston Chur-
chill, "we're going to meet them on the beaches, we're going to
meet them in the valleys, we're going to meet them in the air, we're
going to annihilate them,"23 in accordance with the tactics that they
24had employed over forty years. Then, the most amazing thing
happened with him. At one point he finally said, with regard to all
these documents, "this didn't happen on my watch. "25 "This didn't
happen on my watch?"-it's your watch now!
Then we got into the national settlement with him. They actu-
ally put the document into evidence. Then we got an opportunity
to say, "so you want immunity, you want to emasculate the FDA, you
want all these things, you want to eliminate class actions, you want
to eliminate people's ability to join together, you want to eliminate
punitive damages. Of course you want to look forward, you want a
free reign. You want to say 'forgive us for killing millions of people
in the past and never paying, but give us immunity going forward."'
Obviously we could talk forever about this case and the time al-
lowed does not permit that, but it was an honor to represent the
state.
* We're also running ads to let the public know our position on such is-
sues as accommodating the rights of smokers and non-smokers, and
preventing cigarette sales to minors.
" We believe we are absolutely right in all of the positions we take on
these issues. And we are fighting very hard for what we believe in.
Id. (emphasis added).
23. See MARTIN GILBERT, CHURCHILL: A LIFE 646 (1991).
24. See Ciresi et al., supra note 17, at 480-87 (detailing the industry's litigation
tactics for the past 40 years).
25. See Transcript of Proceedings, State ex reL Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc.,
No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 85584, at *17 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 3,1998).
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